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Abstract 
This paper studies the trends of current accounts and accompanying capital 
movements from a growth-theoretic perspective and attempts to predict the 
credit-debt structure among major industrialized countries (the United States, 
Japan and West Germany), at the turn of the twenty-first century. The past 
movements of national savings and investment support the "habitat" view by 
Feldstein and Horioka that the supply of savings create investment where it is 
generated. Rapid increases in the United States foreign debt may imply, 
however, the relevance of the "traditional" view that capital moves so as to 
equate its rates of return. The simulation exercises show that the ratio of 
external debt to capital stock in the United States will rise to 30-40% over the 
long run in the absence of the recovery of its savings ratio to the historical 
standard of the 1970s. 
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On the International Capital Ownership Pattern at the Turn of the 
Twenty First Century 1 
Koichi Hamada and Kazwnasa Iwata 
In 1987, the current account surplus of Japan was about 87 billion dollars 
or about 3.5 percent of its GNP. The current account surplus of West Germany 
was about 80 billion Marks, i.e. 45 billion dollars or close to 4 percent of its 
GNP. On the other hand, the current account deficit of the United States with 
Japan and West Germany were respectively 54 billion dollars and 22 billion 
dollars in 1986. 
Needless to say, the accwnulation of current account surplus (or deficit) 
implies that a nation accwnulates net credit (or liability) to the rest of the 
world. At the end of 1986, the United States holds net external debt amounting 
to 264 billion dollars (6.3% of nominal GNP), while Japan and Germany hold net 
foreign assets amounting to 180 billion dollars (8.6% of nominal GNP) and 64 
billion dollars (8.6% of nominal GNP) respectively. Table 1 indicates that 
Japan and West Germany are emerging as major capital exporting countries, and 
that the United States is shifting its position from one of capital exporter to 
capital importer. 
How far will these trends continue and what will the credit-liability 
structure among major ind~strial countries become? This paper is an attempt to 
assess these trends of current accounts and accompanying capital movements from 
This work is supported by a research project "Studies of the Prospective 
International Capital Ownership" sponsored by the National Institute for 
Research Advancement (NIRA). We are indebted to Stanley Black for useful 
discussions and to Wooheon Rhee and Sahoko Kaji for their research assistance. 
We also thank the two discussants, Paul Krugman and Giorgio Basevi. 
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a growth-theoretic perspective and to predict credit-debt structure among major 
industrialized countries in the long run, say, at the turn of the twenty-first 
century. We take the United States, Japan and West Germany as specimens of 
major industrialized countries. 
The changing international credit-debt structure depends on the path of net 
national excess savings over investment, which in turn depends on the 
intertemporal consumption choice of economic agents. In the "traditional" view; 
(e.g. A. MacDougall 1960, Kemp 1962), capital as a factor of production moves in 
such a way as to equate its rates of return among countries. In the world where 
capital movements are getting more and more liberalized, the difference in 
saving ratios has a significant long--iun consequence. Hamada (1966) and Ruffin 
(1979) extended the traditional view on capital movements by applying the 
neoclassical growth theory, and derived a simple formula for the asymptotic 
credit (or debt) capital ratio in the world economy where the capital market is 
integrated. 2 Hamada (1966) also proposed a hypothesis on the determinants of 
capital movements that was tested with the U.S.-Canadian example. Hamada and 
Iwata (1985) applied this approach to the recent trend in capital export of 
Japan to the United States and showed that capital movements take more or less 
similar patterns to those predicted by the theoretical model after the 
deregulation of Japanese capital control in 1980. 
On the other hand, Feldstein and Horioka (1980), and Feldstein (1983) 
provide empirical evidences that national investment moves closely with national 
savings. According to them, due to various reasons including capital control 
Ontisuka (1974) applied a similar approach to a small open economy. His 
contribution lies in his explicit attention to adjustment costs involved in 
investment activities and consideration of the stage of development of a 
national economy from a debtor to a creditor. 
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and imperfection of the world capital market, the picture that national 
investment is created by the supply of savings is more realistic than the 
picture we described above under the assumption of perfect capital mobility. 
Their view created a series of disputes on the degree of international capital 
mobility. Some (e.g. Sachs 1981, Obstefeld 1986a,b) cast doubt on this view 
which we may call the "habitat" view, while others found results on saving and 
investment relationships similar to the Feldstein-Horioka paper. (For a summary 
of empirical analysis on this problem, see Dooley, Frankel, and Mathieson 
(1987)). 
If their view were correct in its most extreme form, i.e., if national 
savings supply were to create its own demand completely, the imbalance in 
current account would be only a temporary phenomenon. After proper adjustments, 
the U.S. current account will return to an equilibrium. Recent trends in the 
current account of the three major economies, however, seem to suggest that the 
imbalances may be chronic and that they may be related to various long-term 
macroeconomic parameters. 
We believe that the truth lies in the middle between the extreme form of 
the Feldstein-Horioka view and our conjecture that capital movements are 
determined by macroeconomic parameters and underlying economic behaviour that 
determines the course of economic growth. In the light of recent imbalances of 
current account in these countries, the United States, Japan and West Germany, 
we hope to show that growth-theoretic parameters have significant implications 
for the international credit-debt structure. We will depend on a multi-country 
version of the Solow-type growth model with a single product. Among many 
factors neglected or simplified in this paper, let us point out here two 
important ones. First, the effects of relative prices or real exchange rates 
are neglected. Some of our results may be affected if we introduce more than 
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two commodities and allow relative prices to change. For example, progressive 
real appreciation of Japanese and German currencies may lead to lower net 
exports, and eventually, through income and wealth effects, to lower household 
saving rates in these countries. Further studies are needed to answer this kind 
of question, although our intuition that a country with a lower time-preference 
will become a substantial lender seems to hold in a more general setting. 
Secondly, the role of fiscal policy, and, in particular, that of deficit 
spending is not fully analyzed in this paper, except that our simulation 
exercises implicitly assume specific paths of fiscal expenditures and deficits 
in the future. If we were to adopt the Neo-Recardian position - a position 
that seems to be hardly justifiable from recent behavior of United States 
national savings--, the actual and expected path of fiscal deficit would not 
matter. Still, the actual and expected path of government expenditures could. 
A more strucutred study of fiscal policies is to be left for future research. 
In Section 2, we develop a multi-country growth model as a frame of 
reference for the discussion of the long-'run equilibrium of the asset-liability 
structure in the world economy. Section 3 is an overview of macroeconomic 
variables of these three countries, and presents a conjecture concerning the 
possible long-'run state of the world economy. In Section 4, we present some 
simulation results, which suggest that, if the saving patterns of these three 
countries remain more or less the same as in the past decade, the United States 
will emerge as a heavily indebted economy vis-a-vis Japan and West Germany. The 
increase in the U.S. savings ratio will be a more effective remedy to reduce the 
U.S. indebtedness than the decrease in the Japanese or German savings ratio. 
(For the analysis of the current-account imbalance between the United States and 
Japan, see, e.g. Frankel (1988), Fukao (1988) and Ueda (1988)). 
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2. The Long-Run Model of International Lending 
Let us construct a multi-country growth model that sheds light on the 
long~un property of the asset-liability structure resulting from different 
saving behavior among nations, under neoclassical assumptions on capital 
movements. Assume for simplicity that two countries produce the same good by 
identical linear homogenous well-behaved production functions. The presentation 
below is done for a two-country case, but the result can be generalized for any 
number of countries 
P(t) = F(K(t), N(t)) = Nf(k(t)), 
* * * * P (t) = F(K (t), N* (t)) = N f(k (t)) (1) 
where P(t), K(t), N(t) and k(t) = K(t)/N(t) are output, capital stock, labor and 
per-capita capital stock respectively of the home country at time t. f(k(t)) is 
a per-capita production function. The starred variables are for the foreign 
country. Assume that he labor force is growing at an identical exponential rate 
At * * Atof A, that is N(t) = N(O)e and N (t) = N (o)e where N(t) is the labor force 
at time t. The relative size of the countries is expressed by 0 = N(t)/(N(t) + 
* * * N*(t)) and 0* N (t)/(N(t) + N (t)) so that 0+0 =1. Neglecting any adjustment 
costs involved in domestic as well as foreign investment, we obtain 
·* K(t) S(t) + B (t) , K (t) s*(t) - B(t) (2) 
or 
·* ·* ·* X(t) K(t) - B(t) S(t), X (t) K (t) + B (t) S*(t) (3) 
where S.(t) and K.(t) are savings and capital stock. B(t) and X(t) indicate 
J J 
borrowing and net assets of the home country. Capital stock and savings are 
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measured net of depreciation, and labor is measured by efficiency units. The 
dot indicates time derivatives, X(t) = :, for example. 
We assume that capital movements take place in such a way as to equate the 
rates of return to capital. 
8F(K(t), N(t)) / 8K(t) 8F(K*(t), N*(t)) / 8K* (4) 
or 
f'(k(t)) f'(k*(t)) r(k(t)) (5) 
Equation (5) implies also the equality of factor intensity: 
k(t) k*(t) 
Alternative models can be developed depending on the assumptions concerning 
saving behavior. 
Assumption (i) The ratio of savings out of net domestic product is constant. 
The saving function under this hypothesis is given by 
* * * * S(t) sF(K(t), N(t)), S (t) s F(K (t), N (t)) 
Then the total world accumulation f"(t)(= K(t) + K*(t)) is equal to the total 
saving S(t)(= S(t) + s*(t)). Accordingly, 
* * *K(t) S(t) sF(K(t), N(t)) + s F(K (t), N (t)) 
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We also assumes< s* . Under the assumption of equality of the rates of return 
- * to capital, and denoting N = N+N, 
K(t)/N(t) s f(k(t)), (7) 
where p = 0s + 0*s* is the average saving ratio of the world. Under the 
assumption of constant growth rates of the labor force, (7) can be written in 
terms of per capita capital k(t), 
k(t) sf(k(t)) - Ak(t) (8) 
On the other hand, the change in the liability of the home country equals 
to the required rate of capital growth minus domestic savings, 
B(t) K(t) - S(t) 0 K(t) - sF(K(t), N(t)), (9) 
Thus, B(t) / N(t) = (s - s)f(k(t)), so that in terms of per capita borrowing of 
the home country b(t) 
b(t) (s - s)f(k(t)) - Ab(t) (10) 
Equations (8) and (10) constitute a dynamical system for the evolution of 
variables k(t) and b(t). By construction, the per capita borrowing of the 
foreign country b*(t) satisfies, 
0b(t) + 0 * b * (t) 0 (11) 
9 
Suppose that at the initial moment (t - 0), capital is allocated in such a way 
as to equate its rates of return across countries. Then (8) and (10) will give 
the evolution of the common per capita capital and the net foreign debt (or net 
foreign asset if negative) of the two countries. 
Under the assumption of the well-behaved production function, (8) is the 
standard Solow growth model and has a stationary and stable equilibrium of k, 
such that 
(12)k/f(k) 
The stationary solution of per capita borrowing is then given by 
b (s - s) f(k)/>.. (13) 
From (12) and (13) we obtain 
b/k (s - s)/s. (14) 
Or if we define the per-capita wealth of the home country by x(= k -b) 
(15)x/k s/s 
Obviously, under the assumption of constant saving ratio out of domestic 
production, the ratio of borrowing of a country to the existing capital stock 
approaches a constant which depends on the degree to which the world (weighted) 
average saving ratio exceeds the saving ratio of the country. The ratio of net 
wealth to existing capital approaches the ratio of domestic saving ratio to the 
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world average saving ratio. Needless to say, the country whose saving ratio is 
higher than the world average, i.e. the foreign country in this two-country 
model, emerges as a rentier country with a negative value of bin the long run. 
In this simplified world the shortage of the saving ratio from the world average 
implies a substantial level of international debt. 
Of course, assumption (i) is oversimplified. It would be more natural to 
assume constant saving ratio out of national income. 
Assumption (ii) the ratio of savings out of national income net of interest 
payments is constant. 
We define national income of the two countries as 
Y(t) P(t) - r(k(t))B(t), Y*(t) P*(t) + r(k(t))B(t) (16) 
where r(t)B(t) is the interest payments on debt to the foreign country. This 
saving hypothesis is written as 
s (t) sY(t), S*(t) s*y*(t) (17) 
Exactly by the same reasoning as was used to derive (8) and (10), we obtain 
k(t) sf(k(t)) - >.k(t) - (Os b(t) + 0*s*b*(t))r(k(t)) (18) 
wheres is the average saving ratio, and 
. - * * * (19)b(t)=(s-s)f(k(t))- (0sb(t) + 0 s b (t))r(k(t))->.b(t). 
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Equations (18) and (19) describe the evolution of variable k(t) and b(t). 
Under Assumption (ii) the equilibrium capital intensity will be higher than 
under Assumption (i) for the following reasons. Countries with higher saving 
ratios accumulate foreign assets and those with lower saving ratios accumulate 
foreign debt. The combination of these accumulations will result in a higher 
aggregate saving ratio for the world economy. Also the magnitude of foreign 
debt and asset relative to domestic capital will be larger than under Assumption 
(i). In other words, the distribution of net assets will be more uneven than 
expressed in (14), because under Assumption (ii) the country with net foreign 
debt will save less, and the country with net foreign assets will save more than 
under Assumption (i). For a detailed analysis of the two-country model, see 
Hamada (1966) and Ruffin (1979). 
Assumption (iii) Savings are a constant fraction of the amount of profits. 
In other words, we will assume that national savings are proportional to 
profits, 
s (t) [r(k(t)) - p]X(t), S*(t) [r(k(t))-p* ]X*(t) (20) 
where p and p* are a parameters specific to the two countries. For simplicity 
let us assume p > p* . This saving behavior corresponds to the optimal saving of 
a representative consumer with the rate of time preference (discount factor) p 
3 
12 
in the neighborhood of the balanced path. 3 This assumption is thus justified by 
microeconomic optimizing saving behavior. 
Consider a closed economy optimal saving problem where the representative 




given k and subject to 
0 
k f(k) - C - >..k. 
Then the optimal consumption path is given by 
C
(*) -y-= r(k) - >.. - p,
C 
where -y is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, or, 
in other words the degree of realtive risk aversion. 
In the neighborhood of the stationary state per-capita saving approaches >..k 
and c/c is close to zero. Thert from(*) with c/c = 0, one obtains S/N (r-p)k. 
In our open model, this implies (20). 
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The system of differential equations can be written in terms of per capita 
net asset x(t). 
x<t> [r(k(t)) - p - >..]x(t), x ·*(t) [r(k(t) )- p*- >..]x*(t) (21) 
where k(t) Ox(t) + 8*x*(t). 
This system of differential equations has a non trivial steady-state equilibrium 
if 
r(k(t)) - p - >.. 0 x > 0, and x*= 0 
or 
r(k(t)) - p * - >.. 0, x*> 0, and x 0. (22) 
It is easy to show (cf. Hamada 1965) that only the equilibrium 
corresponding to 
r(k(t)) - p* - >.. 0, x* > 0, and x 0 (23) 
namely the equilibrium that corresponds to non..JZ:ero net assets for the more 
patient saving behavior (the foreign country), is stable. The solution 
indicates a state of "imperialistic" expansion of a country with a lower value 
of time preference. 
The reader may feel uneasy about the strong assumption of country-specific 
but constant rates of time preference. One can agree that the richer a nation 
becomes, the more eager will it be to spend. This implies that the rate of time 
preference is an increasing function of income or wealth. In fact, this 
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condition is a necessary condition for a stable asset holding behavior of a 
small country facing competitive world capital market, (see Obstfeld (1982) and 
Uzawa (1968)). Hence, let us consider the following 
Assumption (iiia) Savings are related to profits in such a way that the 
ratio of savings to profits be a decreasing function of per-capita net 
wealth. 
This can be expressed by the saving behavior given by (20), but p and p* are now 
increasing functions of x(t) and x*(t) such that 
dp/dx > 0, dp*/dx* > 0. 
If the two countries have the same schedule of time preference, then regardless 
of the initial distribution the world economy will approach a steady-state 
solution with an identical value of net wealth such that 
r(k) - ). p(x) P*(x*). (25) 
In other words, by construction of per-capita net wealth and per-capita capital 
k X X* • 
Only under these conditions of identical time preference schedule, the current 
account balance will disappear on the steady-state path. However, if the time 
preferences are uniformly different, i.e., for any value of x 
15 
p(x) ~ P*(x)' 
Then the steady state solution will become the solution of 
r(k) - >. p(x) p*(x)* (26) 
where 
Ox+Ox.k * * 
The case for 0 0*= 1/2 is illustrated in Figure 1. If country 1, say the 
United States, is less patient in its saving behavior than country 2, say Japan, 
the United States will turn out to be a debtor country even in the steady state 
path (recall that k -x =bis the net borrowing of the home country). 
4 
3. The Overview of Macroeconomic Data for the U.S., Japan and Germany 
Given the theoretical framework as a background, let us examine major 
macroeconomic time series after 1960 for the U.S., Japan and Germany. 
4 The rate of time preference may not be a decreasing function of wealth. If 
one is about to starve today and tomorrow as well, one may prefer today's 
increase in consumption much stronger than tomorrow's. If that is the case, 
then p(x) will be a decreasing function for values of x in the neighborhood of 
zero. However, we do not explore the implication of such an assumption here. 
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Figure 2A indicates net national saving rates defined as the ratio of net 
saving to NNP for the three countries. 5 In each country the net saving ratio 
seems to have a downward trend, and notably so after 1970. 
If we take the weighted average of these three countries, 
6 the weighted 
average saving ratio is 11.8% for 1970--86 (see Table 2). If the recent 17 
years' saving ratios were good indicators of the future average savings, and if 
the world were to consist of only these three countries, then the perfect 
capital mobility model under Assumption (i) in the previous section would imply 
that Japan becomes a major creditor country. In the long run, 
38[=(11.8-7.3)/11.8]% of the United States would be owned by the two foreign 
countries. Japan would own about 98%[=(23.4-11.8)/11.8], and West Germany about 
In the long13%[=(13.2-11.8)/11.8] of their respective domestic capital abroad. 
run a large portion of caital stock in the United States will be owned by 
foreign countries. In fact, the simulation exercise in Section 4 indicates that 
more than 40% of U.S. capital will be owned by foreigners in 2010 if the 
difference in saving ratios should remain at the same magnitude as observed in 
the 1980s. 
5 In the United States, government expenditures are not divided into government 
consumption and public investment. This fact makes the U.S. government savings 
figures less than they actually are. In addition, it is difficult to estimate 
properly the capital consumption of the U.S. public capital stock. Here we rely 
on the conventional national account data published by the OECD, thus neglecting 
the adjustment needed for the precise international comparison of net national 
saving (see, Hayashi 1988). 
6 The weights are calculated by the relative national income (expressed in U.S. 
dollars) in each year, and then averaged by the length of the period. 
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Figure 2B shows recent annual time series of net investment ratios (net 
fixed investment plus inventory investment divided by net national product) of 
these countries. They move more or less in a similar fashion to net savings 
rates. This linkage supports in general the "habitat" theory of capital 
movements by Feldstein and Horioka. However, only in the recent five years have 
the two ratios diverged from each other significantly. This discrepancy 
resulted in the substantial current-account surpluses for Japan and West 
Germany, and the substantial current-account deficit for the United States (see 
Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C). Notably, the bilateral current account surpluses of 
Japan and Germany vis-a-vis the United States increased significantly in the 
1980s. This corresponds to the decline of the savings ratio in the United 
States in the 1980s. These facts give at least a weak case for the possible 
validity of the traditional view of the capital movement in the present world 
economy where international capital control is becoming less and less effective. 
Another important evaluation of aggregate savings is its relationship to 
profits. For, under Assumption (iii), the ratio of savings to profits would 
eventually determine capital ownership in the world. Figures 4A and 4B plot 
the ratio of saving to non~esidential net private capital including private 
inventories, and the average rate of return to non~esidential net private 
capital including private inventories, respectively. Both of them are measured 
at replacement cost except for the case of Germany, where the depreciation and 
capital stock at replacement cost are unavailable. With respect to Japan and 
the United States, capital consumption adjustments are made on profit, net 
saving and net capital stock. Incidentally, net national savings in Figure 2A 
are calculated by the depreciation method based on the historic cost. For the 
series of profits in the United States and in Japan we adopted enterprise income 
(operating surplus plus property income excluding net property income from 
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abroad in the corporate and noncorporate enterprise sector). In the case of 
German profits we employed the figure estimated by Gorzig (1987). 
We observe that profit rates tend to converge after the early 1970s, 
although the rate in Japan remains higher than other countries except between 
1972-73, and in 1976 and 1979. 
The Japanese saved substantially less than profits until the beginning of 
the 1970's. Since 1971, however, the Japanese saved an amount almost equivalent 
to profits. West Germany saved slightly less than profits until the early 
1970's, but now they save significantly less than their profits. In the United 
States people saved significantly less than their profits during most of the 
years under observation. The analysis in the last section with Assumption (iii) 
implies that Japan would be a large creditor, say, a neo-imperialist country if 
these tendencies were to continue (see Table 3). 
4. Simulation of the Indebtedness of the United States 
Based on the theoretical model combined with parameters such as the saving 
ratios, the rates of technical progress and the rates of increase in employment 
in the three countries, we can carry out a simulation exercise over medium- and 
long-cerm developments of external borrowing by the United States from Japan and 
Germany. This allows us to examine the question of what the likely long-'run 
consequence of accumulating external debt in the United States will be, and how 
long it will take for the path to reach the neighborhood of a steady state where 
the ratio of external debt to net private capital stock more or less stabilizes. 
We can also draw implications for policy choices on the external imbalances in 
the three countries. In order to analyze the intermediate-'run implications for 
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the flow of funds in the world economy as a basis for the simulation, we will 
draw the moving equilibrium values of capital flows derived from our theoretical 
model. 
Consider a two-country model (m=2) consisting of equations (1) to (5) in 
Section 2, and assume the saving behavior expressed by equation (16), i.e. 
Assumption (ii). It has been shown (Hamada 1966, Hamada-Iwata 1985) that the 
amount of borrowing by country 1 from country 2 required to equate the net 
returns of capital is written as (here we omit the time variable t). 
(27) 
The subscript indicate the country so that B1 is 
the external debt of 
country 1 to country 2. If the two economies are producing a single good under 
the same production function, and if capital is movable so as to equate the 
marginal productivities of capital in two countries, then the changes of 
international debt will depend upon 
(i) the difference in savings ratios, 
(ii) the difference in labor growth rates, and 
(iii) a compensating term for the international interest payments transfer. 
Equation (27) can be rewritten as 
(28) 
The empirical studies mentioned above, included the extension of the 
analysis by allowing different production functions, different rates of labor 
20 
augmenting technical progress, and introducing the effect of capital flows to 
and from the rest of the world other than the two countries in question. 






where g and g are the rates of labor augmenting technical progress in the two 1 2 
countries, and B. (i=l,2) is the inflow of capital to country i from the rest of 
l. 
the world. 
It is also possible to extend the expression for this theoretical value of 
capital movements to the three-country case as 
B (from Japan and Germany to the U.S.) (30)
1 
where country 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the U.S., Japan, and Germany. Equation 
(30) is the basic equation utilized in our simulation. 
In carrying out the simulation exercise, we have not included land, 
although the fit between theoretical and actual values in the case of U.S.-Japan 
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capital movement was much better with land. The reasons are as follows. First, 
the figure of land value in Germany is not available. Secondly, the increase in 
land value is difficult to predict. The following results may overestimate the 
borrowing from Japan, because the rate of capital accumulation is exaggerated by 
the exclusion of land in the denominator. (For the theoretical treatment of 
land in a growth model, see Nichols (1970), and Eaton (1988)). 
Turning to the procedure of the simulation exercise, we first set the 
initial values and parameters of the model. The values of real net domestic 
product, net capital stock and net borrowing by the United States from Japan 
($46 billion) and Germany ($34 billion) are those for 1985. We assume that 
capital stock at the initial period (1985) is allocated so as to equate the 
rates of returns among countries. Net debt of the United States to Japan is 
taken from the Survey of Current Business, but we estimated net debt from 
Germany. This is because only U.S. net debt to the European Community is 
available in the Survey of Current Business. 
From the saving function we can derive net national savings, which are 
formulated as the function of net national product (net domestic product minus 
interest payments). The interest rate is assumed to be constant at 4% which is 
close to the actual rate on external borrowing by the United States from abroad. 
With respect to savings ratios, we provide three different scenarios: 
Case A: Savings ratios will remain constant at the level observed in the 
1980s; the U.S. (4.4%), Japan (20.3%) and Germany (9.2%). 
Case B: The Japanese savings ratio will decline substantially due to the 
aging of the population and the concomitant rise of tax burden including the 
contribution to social security; it is assumed to decline gradually from 20.3% 
to 10% in 2019. 
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Case C: In addition to the change in the Japanese savings rate in Case B, 
the U.S. savings rate is assumed to increase from 4.4% to 8% in 1995 due to the 
sizable cut of the budget deficit and recovery of the personal saving rate to a 
historical standard. 
Case A is a simple extrapolation of the status guo to the future and is 
designed to demonstrate how external debt would rise in the absence of policy 
actions in the long-i:'un. 
Case B examines the impact of changes in the Japanese savings ratio on the 
U.S. external debt. The Japanese savings ratio is often regarded by foreign 
observers as excessively high (see, however, Hayashi (1986) for the factors that 
may exaggerate the Japanese savings ratio.). This scenario seems, however, 
realistic because Japanese household savings may be reduced if the tax burden 
should rise from 36% in 1986 to more than 45% in the early 21st century. The 
Annual Economic Report on the Japanese Economy in 1985 (EPA 1985) examined the 
possibility based on the life cycle hypothesis and concluded that the household 
savings ratio is likely to decline by 7-13 percentage points until the mid 
2010s. So Case Bis consistent with the forecast made in the Annual Report. 
Case C is the most desirable scenario, but it is uncertain whether it will 
be actually realized. Determined political commitment is required to attain the 
increase of the net national savings ratio even if we take the non neo-Ricardian 
view. The improvement in the savings ratio will be even more difficult if we 
take the neo-Ricardian view. 
Under these scenarios, we simulate the borrowing by the United States from 
Japan and Germany based on equation (29). We assume that the rate of technical 
progress and the rate of increase in employment will remain at the same rates as 
those observed in the 1980s. From recent data, the rates of labor-augmenting 
technical progress in the three countries seems to have converged within a 
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range from 1.1% to 2.2% in the 1980s. On the other hand, employmentnarrow 
growth was quite strong in the United States (1.3% increase on a yearly 
average), while that in West Germany was very weak (0.7% decrease). The rate of 
increase in employment in Japan lies in between the two countries and is 0.8%. 
We assume that the trend of strong employment growth in the United States will 
continue over the long-r-un. In addition to a low national savings ratio, strong 
employment growth attracts foreign capital to the United States. (If the United 
States labor force increased at a slower rate, the amount of indebtedness will 
be smaller). 
We take into consideration the international interest payments transfer by 
the United States to Japan and Germany in the simulation, but we ignore interest 
payments by the United States, Japan and Germany to the rest of the world and 
the interest payment between Japan and Germany. 
As will be shown later, interest payments constitute not a negligible part 
of external borrowing by the United States, since the external debt accumulates 
rapidly, given the sizable difference of saving ratios among the three countries 
in the future. 
We obtain the capital stock in the next period after deriving the national 
saving and net external borrowing (lending). Given the rates of technical 
progress and employment growth, we can calculate the net domestic product in the 
next period. Thus the capital stock, the net borrowing (lending) and the net 
domestic product are endogenously determined together with the external debt and 
interest payments abroad. 
Simulation results are presented in Figure SA, SB and SC. All figures are 
expressed in 1985 constant U.S. dollars. In Case A the U.S. debt from Japan and 
Germany grows rapidly from $80 billion in 1985 to $1620 billion in 2000 and 
$4337 billion in 2015, while current-account deficits vis-a-vis Japan and 
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Germany in terms of nominal GNP will remain at about the same level as that in 
1986. The interest payments by the United States to Japan and Germany will 
amount to $65 billion in 2000 under the assumption of constant world interest 
rates at 4%. The current account deficit of the United States with Japan and 
Germany will be $141 billion in 2000 and $235 billion in 2015. This implies 
that the interest payment constitutes 46% of the current-account deficit. This 
share in the current-account will rise to 74% in 2015. Net private capital 
stock will increase about 3.1% annually in the United States during the period 
from 1985 to 2000. The ratio of debt to net private capital stock will rise 
from 2% in 1985 to 23.5% in 2000 and 38.7% in 2015, and this upward trend will 
still continue after 2030. The ratio of debt from Japan to net capital stock 
will stop increasing at the end of the 2120s, and will settle at around 34%, so 
will the sizable share of capital in the United States being owned by the 
Japanese. 
In Case B the rate of increase of capital stock in Japan will become lower 
than that in Case A because of the gradual decline of the Japanese savings ratio 
until 2019. It will slow down from 5.9% to 5.7% during the period from 1985 to 
2000. But the growth rate of capital stock in the United States is not affected 
significantly. The U.S. current-account deficit with Japan and Germany will be 
$109 billion in 2000 and $138 billion in 2015. As compared with Case A, the 
U.S. current-account deficit is about 60% in 2015. The deficit with Germany, 
however, will be virtually unaffected. Net external debt from Japan and Germany 
will amount to $1434 billion in 2000 and $3277 billion in 2015. This amount is 
about three quarters of the net debt for 2015 calculated in Case A. 
Accordingly, the ratio of external debt to capital stock tends to show a 
convergence to the value of 30% in the 2020s. The ratio of debt from Japan to 
capital stock will peak out at the level of 22% in the mid-2010s. 
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In Case C the U.S. capital stock will increase more rapidly than those in 
cases A and B. It will increase by 4.4% annually. External debt will be $1238 
billion in 2000 and $2809 billion in 2015, reflecting the significant reduction 
the ratio ofof current-account deficits with Japan and Germany. Accordingly, 
in 2010, andexternal debt to capital stock will reach the peak of about 16% 
then decline. The ratio of debt from Japan to capital stock will peak out at 
around 13% in 2008. 
The result indicates that the recovery of the national savings ratio in the 
United States over the medium-term is crucial in achieving lower external debt 
ratio and sound economic growth. The decline of the savings ratio in Japan over 
the long-term will help reduce the borrowing from Japan. But other countries 
with high savings like newly industrialized countries (NICs) may well replace 
Japan in the role of capital exporters to the United States. In order for the 
United States to avoid the excessive dependence on foreign capital, the 
effective way is to raise the national savings ratio, possibly through the 
reduction in the budget deficit and the recovery of the household savings rate 
to its historical standards (cf Figure 2A). 
5. Concludin& Remarks 
In this paper we started with the discussion of the two alternative 
approaches to international capital movements: the "traditional" view that 
capital moves to equate its rate of return across countries, and the "habitat" 
view that the supply of savings creates its own demand in the very country where 
The time series data for the United States, Japan and Germanyit is generated. 
indicate that past movements of national savings and investment may generally 
support the habitat view. At the same time, however, rapid increases in the 
United States' foreign debt imply that the traditional view of capital movement, 
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in particular the theory of determinants of capital movements based on growth 
accounting, may be significantly meaningful in the future. In that case, the 
low savings ratio in the U.S. economy may drive itself into a heavily indebted 
economy. 
. 
In addition to the two important factors mentioned in the introduction, 
there are many factors neglected or simplified in the rather naive setting of 
our model. Just to name a few:· changes in industrial structure, unemployment 
and under capacity utilization of capital, (adjustment costs) involved in the 
installment of investment (particularly in a foreign country), distinction of 
portfolio and indirect investment, the effect of exchange rate changes on 
evaluation of capital, the effect of asymmetric corporate income tax across 
countries, and so forth. Also, even with the same level of aggregation as used 
in this paper, one could make the discussion more interesting as well as 
realistic by making demographic structures, saving behavior and technological 
progress to be endogenous. The entire landscape would also be changed if 
developing countries resume their borrowing for development, along with recovery 
of their credit credibility that was seriously damaged by the debt crisis in the 
_past ten years. 
Despite the shortcomings of our model and the simplicity of the calculation 
method, the theoretical values obtained succeeds in tracing fairly well the 
actual development of external borrowing by the United States from Japan and 
notably Germany in the 1980s (see Hamada and Iwata (1985)). The simulation 
exercise based on the "traditional" view demonstrates that the ratio of external 
debt to capital stock in the United States will rise to 30-40% over the long run 
in the absence of efforts to recover its savings ratio to historical standards 
of the 1970s. The reduction in the high savings ratio in Japan or in Germany 
may help reduce the dependence of the United States on foreign capital, but it 
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will have a much weaker effect than the increase in the savings ratio in the 
United States. If the United States wishes to avoid the high external 
debt-capital ratio observed in developing countries at present, it should aim to 
increase its national savings ratio. 
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Table 2. Average Net Saving Rate 
1960-1986 1970-1986 
U.S. 8.21 7.31 
Japan 23.81 23.41 
Ger ■any 14.51 13.21 
2.4 
Table 3. Rate of Return and Capital Accu ■ulation late 
Country Rate of Return/K Saving/( Difference
1960-1986 1970-1986 1960-1986 1970-1986 1960-1986 1970-1986 
U.S. 14.6 11. 7 5.8 4.7 8.8 7.0 
Japan 22.8 15.7 20.3 16.6 2.5 -0.9 
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